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A STUDY OF REGULATORY INTERVENTION
IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS:
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN LOS ANGELES,
DADE COUNTY, AND BOSTON*
HARRY C. KATZ
Associate Professor of Industrial Relations
Alfred P. Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the interaction between public school desegregation and labor
relations in Los Angeles, Dade County, and Boston. First enumerating the ways in
which desegregation led to specific changes in either personnel policies or collective
bargaining agreements in the three school systems, then providing an evaluation of
the performance of the court's regulatory intervention within labor-management
relations in the three school systems. After comparing regulatory performance, the
factors that influence the observed variations in performance are assessed. A
distinction is found between those causal factors that are "environmental" and those
that are under the direct control of the parties. The article concludes with a
theoretical discussion of the differences that exist between the court's regulatory
intervention in collective bargaining and arbitration.
INTRODUCTION
The 1970's have witnessed an increase in regulatory intervention where either
legislative agencies or courts operate as an intervening party within labor-
management relations. Prominent examples of this sort of regulatory interven-
tion include equal employment opportunity and occupational safety and health.
This paper analyzes another case-the federal court's effort to influence the
relations between teachers, school administrators, and community groups as part
*This research was supported by grant #80-0184 from the National Institute of
Education, U.S. Department of Education.
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of school desegregation. Specifically, events in Los Angeles, Dade County
(Florida), and Boston are examined. School desegregation has rarely been
analyzed in this way. As a result, one of the tasks of this article is enumeration
of the ways in which desegregation led to specific changes in either personnel
policies or collective bargaining agreements in the three school systems.
Another task of this article is evaluation of the performance of the court's
regulatory intervention within labor-management relations in the three school
systems. Much criticism has surrounded other instances of regulatory interven-
tion within collective bargaining [1]. One criticism frequently made is that
the process suffers because the regulator ignores both the concerns and talents
of the parties whose actions are being regulated. Instead, the parties spend
much of their time and energy fighting one another and little attention is paid
to the search for solutions to existing problems. A recommendation
commonly made to improve such regulation is that more cooperation occur
between the parties. It is said that the third party, be it a court or an
administrative agency, should consult more extensively with the regulated
parties and rely more heavily on their expertise. But, what can be done to
facilitate this sort of cooperation? And, what are some of the factors that
impede cooperation? Here, much of the criticism of regulation has had little
to offer.
This article tries to remedy this deficiency of past research. After comparing
regulatory performance in the three school systems, the factors that influenced
the observed variations in performance are assessed. A useful distinction can
be drawn between factors that are "environmental" and those under the direct
control of the parties. With those causal factors in mind, the article concludes
with a discussion of the differences that exist between the court's regulatory
intervention in collective bargaining and grievance or interest arbitration, a more
traditional form of intervention in collective bargaining.
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The case studies that follow are not exhaustive.l The intent is to present a
general overview of the experiences within each school system and highlight the
aspects of each case that illustrate the major themes of the article.
Los Angeles
In Los Angeles, the United Teachers of Los Angeles (UTLA) and the school
administration made anumber of modifications to the district's personnel policies
and collective bargaining agreement as part of school desegregation, including:
1This article is part of a larger research project [2]. For other research that discusses
the interaction between labor relations and desegregation see reference [3].
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. a voluntary teacher transfer program with "return rights" used to
facilitate faculty integration across schools in the district;
. a modified seniority transfer program used when teachers move with
students reassigned as part of student integration;
. an Urban Classroom Teachers Program that provides an 11 percent
salary premium to teachers who voluntarily transfer to urban core
schools;
. a bilingual incentive pay program that pays an 11 percent salary premium
to teachers of bilingual education in select schools.
These and other personnel policies originated in court-directed hearings that
evolved into consultative planning sessions. The consultative sessions were
multipartite and typically involved the federal court (Judge Paul Egly), the
school board and administration, the VILA, the plaintiffs in the original
desegregation suit, and citizen groups such as BUS-STOP (a group opposed to
mandatory busing).
An example of this consultative process is provided in the evolution of the
Urban Classroom Teachers Program. Staffing schools in core urban areas was
a perennial problem in the Los Angeles system. Those schools had a higher than
average faculty turnover rate as, upon accumulating seniority in core schools,
teachers often transferred to schools in more affluent neighborhoods. That
staffing problem was exacerbated by the district's faculty integration program,
which initiated the transfer of a substantial number of black faculty out of the
core urban schools.
Judge Egly concluded that an incentive pay scheme would be one way to
improve the educational process in the district's urban core schools. The judge
encouraged the school administration, the teachers' union, and community
groups to design such a scheme [4]. After extensive debate, the VTLA and the
school administration returned to the court with the agreed-upon Urban
Classroom Teachers Program. To overcome the union's initial opposition to the
existence of a pay differential, the court agreed to fund the 11 percent salary
premium included in the program out of a desegregation budget provided to
the court by the California State Legislature.
The Urban Classroom Teachers Program (UCTP) reflects the competing
demands that had arisen in the multipartite bargaining surrounding the program's
development. Teachers in the program are required to perform additional duties
that amount to two to three hours of service per week, including such activities
as counseling students after regular school hours. As part of the program,
teachers also engage in five days of staff development (with additional
compensation). The program is described in the court's desegregation order and
is outlined in the union's collective bargaining agreement [5]. As stipulated in
the collected bargaining agreement, the VILA accepts the program only as long
as it is funded by the court.
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The main advantage of the UCTP from the viewpoint of the school
administration was that it helped faculty recruitment in the core urban schools.
The district has been able to completely avoid mandatory teacher transfers
after the creation of UCTP. In addition, the administration saw the UCTP as
a way to clarify and strengthen teacher work requirements within those schools.
Principals were strongly in favor of the provisions within UCTP that outlined
specific additional duties required of teachers.2
The UTLA was enticed by the court's provision of additional salary funding.
From the union's viewpoint, the other advantage of the program was that it
reduced the demand for the kind of mandatory transfers that preceded the
UCTP. The inclusion of the UCTP in the collective bargaining agreement also
gave teachers recourse to the grievance procedure outlined in that agreement as
a mechanism by which disputes over the implementation of the UCTP could be
resolved.
The key to the development of these creative solutions in Los Angeles was
the consultative process that brought together the court, the union, the school
administration, and community representatives. Through both formal and
informal discussions, Judge Egly provided a forum in which the affected parties
could meet and discuss their concerns. At the same time, the court has retained
final decision-making authority. Consultation has been provided without
eroding the court's ability to make judgments that do not completely satisfy
one or more of the affected parties.
The existence of a consultative process in Los Angeles has not eliminated
conflicts between the affected parties. For example, the plantiffs to the
desegregation suit and the UTLA have often disagreed. The plaintiffs opposed
the union's original petition to intervene in the case, and the plaintiffs continue
to be unhappy with the use of seniority and pay differentials in the UCTP.3
Nor has there always been agreement between the teachers' union and the school
administration. The union prefers strict adherence to seniority, while the
administration seeks to create a greater degree of flexibility within teacher transfer
procedures. The point is that although disagreements remain, the parties in Los
Angeles have been able to effectively utilize their own expertise to design
solutions to many of the problems that have arisen in the desegregation process.
And further, when the parties do not agree, the consultative process produces
mechanisms by which the parties clarify their points of agreement and disagree-
ment. An example of the latter is the "Joint Status Report" in which the
UTLA and the school administration outlined their views regarding a bilingual
incentive pay scheme [8].
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2These and other viewpoints of the school administration and the teachers' union were
gathered during interviews in January 1981 with members of the Deputy Superintendent's
Office for Staff Relations, Los Angeles Unified School District, and the executive officers
of the UTLA.
3The plaintiffs opposed the salary differential as a form of "combat pay." [6]
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The desegregation process in Dade County also has involved a substantial
amount of consultation and accommodation between the court and teachers.
This was particularly true in the early stages of the desegregation case in Dade
County. During the early phase the teachers' representative, the Classroom
Teachers Association (CTA), supported the integration process and participated
actively with the Florida Desegregation Center in the design of the
desegregation plan. In fact, the CTA had supported integration of the Dade
schools prior to federal court involvement. The CTA's support for integration
came in 1962 in the aftermath of the association's formation by way of a
merger of two segregated teachers' association that had existed as part of Dade's
segregated dual school system [9]. This merger created the first integrated
teacher organization south of the Mason-Dixon Line.
Cooperation between the federal court and the Classroom Teachers
Association took many forms. The court followed a CTA recommendation and
ordered that any mandatory teacher transfers required as part of faculty
integration follow seniority. The CTA went on to encourage voluntary teacher
. transfers during students integration, with the president of the association
taking the lead by volunteering to be reassigned to teach in one of Dade's inner-
city schools and thereby give up the prerogatives of union office.
The accommodative spirit initiated in the early phase of desegregation in
Dade continued during the discussions carried out by the school administration
and teachers as part of their later collective bargaining relationship. Faculty
racial guidelines with a transfer system and hardship appeals board now appear
as part of the teachers' collective bargaining agreement [10] .
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The spirit of compromise that characterizes the response to desegregation by
teacher unions in Los Angeles and Dade County is in marked contrast to the
experience in Boston. From the start, the teachers' union in Boston adamantly
protested the initiation of court-order desegregation. The union, like many
teachers in the school system, was unsympathetic to charges that the school
system was blatantly discriminatory and required major restructuring to set it
right. In addition, the Boston Teacher Union (BTU) argued that reorganization
of the school system would be "too educationally disruptive." [11]
The BTU was particularly upset about the large number of teacher transfers
and reassignments that were produced by desegregation. These transfers and
reassignments followed the creation of new schools, the closing of a number of
schools, and the large-scale reorganizations of within-school programs, which were
all part of the desegregation plan. To facilitate those transfers, the court felt it
necessary to overrule existing language in the collective bargaining agreement
that existed between the Boston School Committee and the teachprs' union.
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The court (Judge W. Arthur Garrity) argued that both the speed and the
magnitude of teacher transfers precluded the use of the elaborate bidding and
rating transfer procedures outlined in the collective bargaining agreement.
The clash between the teachers' union and the court regarding transfer rights
came to typify the desegregation process in Boston. Although Judge Garrity
regularly has conducted hearings that brought the various affected parties
together, those hearings rarely have produced problem-solving activities. A
reflection of the lack of cooperation is the BTU's painstaking, though futile,
efforts to maintain a separation between collective bargaining and the desegre-
gation process. Those efforts are illustrated by the absence of any explicit
language in the teachers' collective bargaining agreement concerning desegregation
or its consequences. Yet, the federal court's desegregation orders have led to
frequent modifications of the school district's personnel policies which, in turn,
have led to changes in the policies of the BTU. A poignant example is provided
by minority faculty hiring, the issue that came to dominate the Boston
desegregation case in the late 1970's and early 1980's.
In his original desegregation orders, Judge Garrity concluded that one aspect
of segregation in the Boston school system was the limited presence of blacks
on the school faculty. The judge set a goal that 20 percent of all teachers in the
Boston system should be black and ordered the immediate hiring of 280 new,
permanent, black teachers [12]. The 20 percent figure was equal to the fraction
of the total population of Boston that was black, according to the 1970 census.
Prior to the court's orders (1973), the percentage of black teachers in the
Boston system had been 7.1 percent. Throughout the late 1970's, Judge Garrity
issue amended "hiring orders" in response to the school system's slow progress in
meeting the court's 20 percent goal and a number of other complications.
One of the complications the court had to wrestle with was a change in the
school department's hiring policy. From 1975 on, the school department
continued to hire a number of new teachers, but only on a provisional basis
(one-year contracts), and it discontinued hiring teachers on a permanent,
contractual basis. The motives behind this policy switch and the court's
response to that change in policy are rather complicated. What is clear is that
this switch in policy limited the magnitude of minority hiring and frustrated
the intent of the court's minority hiring goal.
Another complication during the 1980-81 school year made the court choose
between continuing affirmative action in minority hiring and preserving the
seniority rights of existing faculty. That choice was created by pressures placed
on the Boston school administration to reduce the total number of teachers in
the system. A primary source of that pressure was the massive decline in
enrollment that has occurred in the Boston system. In 1965 total enrollment
in the school system stood at 94,035. Enrollment climbed to 97,344 in 1970
and then declined to 84,988 in 1975 and by January, 1981, stood at 64,481.
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and teacher workloads remained constant, the drop in enrollment of 32,863
that occurred between 1970 and 1981 would have facilitated a potential
reduction of 1315 teachers (or 25% of the total number of teachers in 1973-74).
In fact, the total number of teachers in the system has remained constant
throughout the 1970s.4 However, the 1981 passage of Proposition 2~ in a
statewide general election has created the prospect of substantial reductions in
Boston's municipal revenue sources.
The Boston School Committee voted to layoff 960 teachers at the start of
the fall 1981 term.s The question that came before the court was how to
allocate those reductions in the number of teachers. If teacher workforce
reductions occur according to seniority, the number and percentage of black
teachers in the system will drop significantly since most of the black teachers
were hired after 1973, the start of the desegregation case. For example, if the
school department were to carry out its layoff of 960 teachers according to
strict seniority, the percentage of black teachers in the system would drop from
19 to 8 percent.
In light of the effects of layoff by seniority, Judge Garrity ordered teacher
layoffs to be performed in such a way that the systemwide percentage of black
teachers remain at the existing level of 19 percent [13]. The judge also required
that black teachers receive an absolute preference for recall until a 20 percent
figure is reached and after that point, no fewer than 20 percent of the teachers
subsequently recalled or recruited be black. The school committee has agreed
to follow the court's orders when implementing teacher layoffs.
The Boston Teachers Union actively participated in the debate that
surrounded the court's efforts to increase minority faculty representation. Early
on, the BTU unsuccessfully appealed Judge Garrity's 20 percent hiring order
[14]. Later, the union adamantly expressed its opposition to "any plan which
gives preferential treatment to black provisional teachers." [15] .
When reviewing the course of relations in the 1970's between the BTU and
the school department, it might at first seem surprising to learn that the BTU
did not adamantly resist the increased hiring of provisional teachers and the
halt in the hiring of new permanent teachers. No union likes the wage and
benefit reductions that accompanied the shift from permanent to provisional
contracts, and one might have expected the BTU to firmly resist the change in
the school department's hiring policy. In fact, it can be argued that the BTU
took a number of steps to exacerbate differences between permanent and
provisional teachers, including its negotiation of a job-security agreement with
a no-layoff clause that covers only permanent teachers.
Part of the union's motivation for the exclusion of provisional teachers from
coverage by the no-layoff clause stems from the fact that provisional teachers
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4The number of teachers in the Boston school system was 5214 in 1973-74 and 5150 as
of March, 1981.
sIn March, 1981,117 provisional teachers were laid off in a manner that preserved the
existing percentage of black teachers.
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tend to staff expanding program areas such as bilingual education, while
permanent teachers generally staff shrinking "regular education" programs.6
In the face of the district's policy of laying off by certification area, the
exclusion of provisional teachers from coverage by the no-layoff clause was
necessary to protect the job security of senior, permanent teachers certified
in the shrinking regular education area.
With respect to the imminent layoffs, the BTU has firmly held to the position
that any teacher layoffs follow the seniority provisions outlined in the union's
contract [16]. The union has initiated court appeals of both the school
department's plans for layoffs and Judge Garrity's orders to override seniority
provisions if layoffs do occur.
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE
VARIATIONS IN REGULATORY PERFORMANCE
When comparing experiences of the three school systems, two criteria stand
out as indicators of the quality of the regulatory intervention. One criterion is
the teacher union's attitude toward third-party intervention. In both Los
Angeles and Dade County, the unions accepted and, in some instances, strongly
supported the court's desegregation goals. However, in Boston, throughout the
desegregation process the teachers' union remained antagonistic toward court
intervention.
A second criterion is the extent to which the union participates with the
court, the school administration, and community groups in problem-solving
activities. Here, as well, the Los Angeles and Dade systems are superior to
Boston. The Los Angeles and Dade County public schools have devised a
larger number and wider range of problem-solving activities as part of the
desegregation process when compared to Boston.
What caused these differences in the performance of the court's regulatory
intervention in labor relations in the three school systems? My answer to this
question requires that a distinction be made between two broad categories of
causal factors. One set of causal factors can be called environmental variables,
because each was largely not under the control of the parties once the desegre-
gation process began. These environmental factors include the racial composition
of the faculty at the time desegregation began; whether or not the teachers had
formal bargaining rights at the time desegregation was started; and the economic
conditions that prevailed in the school system during desegregation.
Black teachers were a significant political force in support of desegregation
in Los Angeles and Dade County. In both, when the desegregation process
began there was already a sizable number of black teachers in the school system.
6For example, as of March 1981, provisional teachers comprised 43 percent of all
bilingual teachers while only 7 percent of all regular education teachers in the system were
on provisional status.
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Black teachers comprised roughly 18 percent of the full-time teachers in both of
these systems at the start of desegregation [17]. In Boston, in contrast, black
teachers represented only 7 percent of the teacher workforce at the time
desegregation began.
But the number of black teachers is not the only important influence. Black
teachers were a significant political force within the Dade County school system
not only because their numbers were large. The merger of black and white
teacher associations that had preceded the start of desegregation in Dade was a
critical factor in shaping the accommodative stance taken by Dade teachers
toward integration.
The accommodative stance toward desegregation taken by teachers' nnions in
Los Angeles and Dade County also was encouraged by the fact that in those
systems desegregation occurred at a time when the teachers' union lacked formal
collective bargaining rights. In both cases, state laws did not then grant
bargaining rights to local public school teachers. Deprived of formal bargaining
rights, participation in a consultative relationship with the federal court during
desegregation was important to the teachers' unions for two reasons. First,
participation satisfied some of the unions' unfulfilled demands to be involved in
school decision making. Second, the unions used their participation with the
court to strengthen their demands for full collective bargaining rights. In Los
Angeles and Dade County, the teachers' unions went to the public with appeals
that their involvement in desegregation illustrated their responsibility and entitled
them to more extensive collective bargaining privileges. 7
That was not the case in Boston where by the time desegregation started
(1973), the teachers' union already possessed full collective rights and had
signed formal contracts for eight years. In Boston, the teachers' union knew that
it could affect decisions through the collective bargaining process. The security
provided by their collective bargaining agreement in a sense gave the Boston
Teachers Union the freedom to engage in a combative relationship with the
federal court.
The point is not that collective bargaining is a hinderance to accommodation
during desegregation. Rather, my claim is that a firmly entrenched system of
collective bargaining may provide a teachers' union with an inclination to resist
the beginning of regulatory intervention in labor-management relations.
Another environmental factor that shaped the response to desegregation in all
three school systems was the economic situation. In Boston, the economic
environment produced an atmosphere of contraction that made problem solving
and the search for areas of joint gain difficult. A contractionary environment
was produced in Boston by massive declines in enrollment. Consequently, there
always existed a threat that the school committee would respond to these
enrollment declines by laying off a substantial number of teachers. In response
1
\
,
I,
'I
I
J
~
7These appeals show up repeatedly in newspapers and minutes of city council meetings
in both cities.
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8Dade County school enrollments climbed from 233,222 in 1968 (the year desegregation
started) to 246,534 in 1974. Over the same period the number of full-time teachers
increased from 9482 to 11,635.
9Enrollments in the Los Angeles school system declined from 613,460 in 1975 to
542,482 in 1979.
10These events are discussed in more detail in reference [18] .
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In Los Angeles and Dade County, enrollment trends did not create a
contractionary environment. Enrollments were expanding in the aftermath of
the start of desegregation in Dade County.s As a result, even though the system
was not under a court order to do so, it was relatively easy for the Dade system
to expand employment opportunities for minorities. Enrollments in Los
Angeles schools have been declining during desegregation, although not nearly
on the scale of the decline in Boston.9 Over this same time period the number
of full-time teachers in the Los Angeles system has remained constant.
One could then argue that the contrasting economic environments within the
three school systems set the tone for regulatory performance in these three
school systems. There are, however, a number of issues that call into question
the simple notion that the economic environment was a determinant causal
factor. First, as mentioned earlier, until the spring of 1981 the Boston Teachers
Union did not actually face layoffs. Enrollments may have been declining
massively over the 1970s, but the number of teachers in the system was not
reduced through layoffs. Second, even in the face of declining enrollments,
there were a number of potential areas of agreement between the federal court
and the BTU around which problem solving could have occurred. These
included the court's success in assuring full funding for the school year in 1976
and the limitations imposed by the court on the school committee's attempt to
close schools in 1979.10 Furthermore, in the early phases of desegregation in
Boston, there were a number of other potential agreements that could have
been forged between the court and the teachers' union. The parties could have
arranged some sort of orderly teacher transfer mechanism as was used in Los
Angeles and Dade County. Likewise, the court, the teachers' union, and the
school administration could have fashioned mechanisms to increase minority
hiring without having to hire minority teachers on a provisional contract basis.
The question that remains is why the parties so rarely took advantage of the
potential areas of joint gain that did arise during the desegregation process in
Boston.
Part of the explanation lies in steps taken by the parties during the
desegregation process. Particular actions that spurred compromise in Los
Angeles and Dade include the use of incentives to create the possibility of
joint gain; the extent to which agreement was reached early on; and the degree
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,460 in 1975 to
to which there was formal integration of collective bargaining and court-
directed activities. These actions, in contrast to the environmental factors
discussed above, were under the direct control of the parties.
Although the economic environment within each school system was
important because it influenced the extent to which situations arose where one
party had to lose, to some degree the parties themselves could create expansion-
ary environments. An example is provided in Los Angeles where the court's use
of the state's desegregation budget was used to encourage compromise. Money
from that state budget functioned as a "carrot" that enticed the UTLA to accept
the Urban Teachers Classroom Program. State payment of the salary differential
within the UCTP thereby created a bargaining situation in which both the court
and the teachers' union could gain. With the possibility of joint gain, it was
much easier for the parties to reach agreement on some of the more contentious
issues surrounding the UCTP.
The involvement of the UTLA in the design of the Urban Classroom Teachers
Program set a positive tone that facilitated the discussion of problems that arose
later in the Los Angeles desegregation process. In that way, the manipulation of
state funding had the long-run effect of encouraging cooperative bargaining as
well as solving some of the district's short-run teacher transfer problems.
In Dade County, it was agreement reached early on regarding the faculty
integration program that set the tone for a cooperative relationship. There, the
court's provision of seniority rights as part of mandatory transfers in the teacher
integration program facilitated both teachers' acceptance of mandatory transfers
and encouraged the union's active support of voluntary teacher transfers. The
union's involvement in the implementation of teacher transfers then facilitated
reconciliation during the later phases of Dade's desegregation plan.
In contrast, the lack of early agreement in the Boston system created a
noncooperative atmosphere. By failing to reach agreement in the early stages
of desegregation when the economic environment was more favorable, the
parties in Boston were further handicapped in their efforts to cope with the
difficult conditions that arose later on in Boston. The contractionary fiscal
environment that developed in Boston in 1981 would have been difficult to
handle even if the parties had approached those problems with the background
of a good working relationship.
In both Los Angeles and Dade County, parts of the desegregation program
and agreed-upon modifications on personnel policies are spelled out in the
teacher union's collective bargaining agreement. Inclusion within the collective
bargaining agreement signalled formal acceptance by the union of these
desegregation programs. And, the integration of collective bargaining and court-
directed programs eased adjustment to the desegregation process. By describing
the programs in the contract, the union and the school administration could
rely on the contract's grievance procedure to adjudicate disagreements that
arose over the implementation of these policies.
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In Boston, the absence of any contract language concerning the desegregation
program was a signal of the union's disagreement with much of that program
and furthermore, operated as a continuing source of confusion. For instance,
without contract language concerning issues such as faculty integration, the
jurisdiction of disputes over that issue remained unclear. The circumstances
surrounding a grievance that arose in Boston illustrates that confusion. The
Boston Teachers' Union at one point filed a grievance concerning the
implementation of the court's racial balance guidelines. The arbitrator hearing
the case was at a loss as to how to rule on the grievance and appealed to Judge
Garrity for a clarifying ruling. The judge issued a ruling and sent the grievance
case back to the arbitrator. The existence of contract language regarding faculty
integration might not have prevented the grievance from arising but at least it
would have sped up the process and avoided shuffling the case between the
court and the arbitrator.
It could be argued that a cooperative relationship did not emerge among the
federal court, the school administration, and the Boston Teachers Union because
of the level of citizen opposition toward desegregation and busing that prevailed
in Boston. There was a lot of citizen opposition to desegregation in Boston, but
it should be recognized that similar opposition existed in Los Angeles. By 1979,
the Los Angeles school board was dominated by individuals who opposed busing.
Furthermore, one of the most active community groups in the Los Angeles area
was BUS-STOP, a group opposed to busing and Judge Egly's desegregation
orders.ll Nor was the end of the dual school system readily accepted by all
of the Miami community. Yet, in Dade County and Los Angeles the parties
involved in the labor-management relationship were able to create a cooperative
relationship that was separated from surrounding community opposition to
desegregation.
It is more difficult to assess the impact of the various political environments
that surrounded the three school systems. In many ways the combative
relationships that prevailed in Boston during desegregation are representative
of the style of Massachusetts politics. That style is characterized by acrimonious
fights between the parties involved in any political decision and the postpone-
ment of realistic decision making until the arrival of a crisis point. Rarely does
patient problem solving occur as part of that mode of governance. Illustrations
of this process are provided in the recent financial crises within the Massachusetts
Bay Transit Authority, the Boston city government, and the Massachusetts state
government. For the court, the Boston Teachers Union, the school
administration, and community groups to have forged a cooperative relationship
would have required that the parties break out of that pattern.
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11The course of school desegregation in Los Angeles was altered abruptly in the spring
of 1981 when the California Supreme Court let stand Proposition 1, an initiative approved
by California voters. That initiative prohibits court-ordered busing unless (unlike in Los
Angeles) it was initiated to correct intentional segregation. At this time, it is unclear how, if
at all, the end of mandatory busing will affect labor relations in the Los Angeles schools.
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The parties in the Los Angeles school system, on the other hand, had the
benefit of operating in a state noted for its reform style of government. One
would expect that a number of the features of that reform style, such as a
greater emphasis on planning, would facilitate a more cooperative response to
regulatory intervention. Yet, much cooperation occurred in Dade County where
the style of politics is not of the California reform mode. As in the case of the
economic environment, I am led to the conclusion that the political environment
is an influential but not a determining causal factor.
At a time when the two leading nationalteacher organizations are competing
actively in representation elections throughout the country, it is important to
consider the impact of the policies of those national organizations on the
desegregation process. This sample does contain a mix of national affiliations.
In Dade County the Classroom Teachers Association was affiliated with the
National Education Association throughout the 1960's. However, when the
Classroom Teachers Association gained full bargaining rights in 1974, its
affiliation shifted to the American Federation of Teachers. The Boston Teachers
Union has remained affiliated with the AFT since the local union's inception
in 1965. In Los Angeles, since 1974 the United Teachers has maintained a
form of dual affiliation where individuals within the UTLA are free to join
either the AFT or the NEA, and the UTLA itself maintains no formal affiliation
with any national teachers' union.
It is my conclusion, however, that the national policies of the AFT and the
NEA had no substantive impact on the conduct of union policies with respect
to desegregation in the three school systems under study. The policies developed
by the teachers' unions in the three systems were influenced by political
pressures within the local unions, teacher attitudes, and community pressures,
but not by the national teacher organizations.
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This study reveals some of the difficulties the federal court faced in its role
as a regulator of labor-management relations. Many of the court's problems
derive from the fact that the court had to perform two functions. On the one
hand, the court operated as an enforcer of orders that at times were perceived to
be distasteful to both management and labor. In addition, the court was trying
to encourage the participation and cooperation oflabor and management in the
design of the desegregation plan. When attempting to satisfy these roles the
court could adopt elements of the mode of operation utilized by grievance or
interest arbitrators, but in some ways the court had to forge a role that
superseded either of those models.
During the desegregation process in the three school systems, the court at
times had to operate as an enforcement agency because parts of the court's
desegregation orders were opposed by labor and management. An example is
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provided in the dispute concerning minority faculty hiring in Boston. There, at
the start of school desegregation, both the school administration and the
teacher's union opposed the court's efforts to increase the representation of
blacks within the school faculty. As this study shows, the opposition to the
court's hiring orders included subtle maneuvers such as the shift to the
employment of provisional status teachers. In this role of an enforcer of orders
that both labor and management opposed, the court operated in a capacity that
is not common to either grievance or interest arbitration. An arbitrator, in
contrast, typically is in the position of compromising the demands of labor and
management.
The desegregation process also contains instances in which the participation
of labor and management in the design of third-party orders provides benefits,
as is the situation frequently during grievance and interest arbitration. The
Urban Classroom Teachers Program in Los Angeles is an example of a creative
problem-solving activity whose design required the expertise and involvement of
the affected parties. The often-stated dictum that labor and management work
better with policies they help to design is strongly supported by the experiences
in these three school systems.
The difficult issue is how the regulating party can encourage participation
while at the same time administering distasteful regulations. The experiences
in Los Angeles and Dade County do suggest some tactics that could be utilized
to encourage cooperation. These include the manipulation of financial
incentives to provide situations of joint gain. Furthermore, events in these two
cities suggest the value of informal multipartite discussions and early agreement
in the regulatory process. Yet, there may be no simple answer as to how
regulatory intervention can balance its two roles. At a time when regulatory
intervention within collective bargaining in the public and private sectors is on
the rise, this is a problem worthy of more extensive consideration.
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